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Abstract 
We use data from restaurants in Shanghai, China to conduct a new empirical analysis of 
prices and coupons. Our results show a positive relationship between prices and online coupons. 
Moreover, the price premium from couponing is higher for restaurants about which consumer 
values appear to be more uncertain. When consumer uncertainty is high, restaurants that offer 
coupons have an average price that is about 60 percent higher than similar restaurants that do not 
issue coupons. When uncertainty is low, restaurants that offer coupons have an average price that 
is about ten percent higher. These findings are consistent with online couponing in the restaurant 
industry being used for price discrimination and as a promotional device in the presence of 
higher uncertainty in consumer valuations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do firms issue coupons?  In an influential empirical study, Nevo and Wolfram 
(2002) explore the relationship between grocery store shelf prices and manufacturers’ coupons 
for ready-to-eat breakfast cereals.  They find that prices become lower when coupons are issued, 
a result that is inconsistent with the standard monopoly price discrimination theory of couponing 
but can be consistent with models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings (oligopoly models 
are perhaps more appropriate for the breakfast cereals market).  This leaves largely open the 
question of whether there are other market settings where the price-coupon relationship supports 
the standard monopoly price discrimination theory. 
In this paper, we use data from restaurants in Shanghai, China to conduct a new empirical 
analysis of prices and coupons.  This market has two important characteristics that differ from 
breakfast cereals.  First, many consumers are uncertain about their values for various restaurants, 
which differ both in qualities and in horizontal attributes.  Even for restaurants at a specific 
quality level, consumer values still vary greatly due to preference diversity and may often be 
uncertain, especially since many consumers are short-term residents and tourists.  Second, for a 
city with more than 48,000 restaurants, the market may be more properly viewed as one of 
monopolistic competition: each firm, facing its residual demand, chooses its own price optimally 
like a monopolist, without considering the effects of its actions on the market price.  This market 
environment thus potentially provides a setting to test the standard monopoly price 
discrimination role of coupons.  
Interestingly, there is a website, www.dianping.com, which provides restaurant 
information, customer evaluations, customer reviews, and online coupons for almost 40,000 
restaurants in Shanghai.  Due to possible search costs, uncertain consumers are more likely to 
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visit the Dianping website to gather information about a restaurant.  The restaurant may then use 
online coupons for price discrimination, charging a high price for informed (loyal) consumers 
who are less likely to visit the website but a lower price to attract uncertain consumers who 
download the online coupon.   
We use these data to estimate a descriptive model that relates the average expenditure per 
customer (“prices”) to online couponing, uncertainty in consumer valuations for the restaurant, 
restaurant quality, and demand and cost factors.  Our results show a positive relationship 
between prices and coupons.  Moreover, the price premium from couponing is higher for 
restaurants about which consumer values appear to be more uncertain.  When consumer 
uncertainty is high, restaurants that offer coupons have an average price that is about 60 percent 
higher than similar restaurants that do not issue coupons.  When uncertainty is low, restaurants 
that offer coupons have an average price that is about ten percent higher.  These findings are 
consistent with online couponing in the restaurant industry being used for price discrimination 
and as a promotional device in the presence of higher uncertainty in consumer valuations. 
Several other papers have examined empirically the price effects from couponing. 
Narasimhan (1984) finds a positive correlation between prices and coupons for 20 consumer 
products, while Levedahl (1986) finds a positive correlation between paper towel prices and 
coupons.  In contrast, Nevo and Wolfram (2002) find that shelf prices for breakfast cereal are 
lower during periods when coupons are available.  Similarly, Anderson and Song (2004) show a 
negative correlation between the shelf price of packaged goods and coupons when the coupon 
has a relatively small discount value.  Our paper contributes to this literature by offering new 
evidence from the restaurant market; an environment where consumer uncertainty is important 
4 
 
and promotions are through online coupons.
1
  Our finding that firms may use the Internet to price 
discriminate in favour of value-uncertain consumers through online coupons is interesting˗˗it 
differs from the usual assumption in the literature that the informed consumers receive lower 
prices and the uninformed consumers are discriminated against (e.g., Varian, 1980).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
motivation for our empirical analysis.  Section 3 outlines the empirical model and Section 4 
describes the data.  Results are reported in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
2.1 Restaurant market 
The restaurant market in Shanghai provides an interesting setting to study why firms 
issue coupons.  Shanghai is the largest city in China, with many tourists and short-term visitors.  
As of December 2010, it has more than 48,000 restaurants at various quality levels.  For 
restaurants at a certain quality level, consumer valuations still vary greatly due to preference 
diversity.  To extract surplus from consumers who happen to have high valuations, a restaurant 
has the incentive to charge a high price.  But to attract consumers whose valuations are uncertain, 
a restaurant may need to lower its price.  Thus restaurants have incentives to practice price 
discrimination. 
The Internet provides a useful tool both for consumers to learn about restaurants and for 
restaurants to engage in price discrimination.  One popular website for consumers to gather 
information is www.dianping.com.  Dianping is a comprehensive online and physical platform 
                                                 
1
 Related research on coupons also includes, for example, Neslin (1990), Neslin and Clarke (1987), Neslin, 
Henderson, and Quelch (1985), and Vilcassim and Wittink (1987). Our research is also related to the theoretical 
literature on price discrimination, for example, Anderson and Dana (2009), Holmes (1989), Nahata, Ostaszewski 
and Sahoo (1990), and Varian (1980). 
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that collects reviews of restaurants, shops, hotels and other establishments.  Potential customers 
can go through the reviews to get information about a restaurant, including its average 
expenditure per customer, number of reviews, and average customer evaluations in three 
dimensions: taste, environment, and service.  The website also has information about whether a 
restaurant offers coupons and, if it does, information about the coupon.  Consumers can either 
print these online coupons or download them to their cellular telephones.  They can then redeem 
their coupon when dining at the restaurant.  To the extent that there is search cost to visit the 
website, it is the uncertain consumers who tend to do so and are thus able to find the coupons.  
The uncertainty of some consumers and the fact that uncertain consumers are more likely to 
search www.dianping.com may thus provide both the incentive and a mechanism for restaurants 
to price discriminate through online coupons. 
 
2.2 Simple model 
To motivate our empirical analysis, we outline a simple theoretical model that examines 
optimal restaurant prices with and without coupons.  Suppose that the consumer valuation for a 
restaurant is  kV , where    or  , each with probability 1/2, and 0 . The 
realizations of   are independent for each consumer.  We consider the restaurant market in 
Shanghai as a differentiated market with many firms, where each firm, facing the residual 
demand of a unit mass of consumers, prices as a monopolist.
2
  A higher-quality restaurant has a 
higher k , and a higher  indicates more uncertainty in consumer valuations for the restaurant. 
Firms can issue online coupons on www.dianping.com where consumers may also evaluate 
restaurant qualities.  There are two types of consumers.  A type-I consumer knows the realization 
                                                 
2
 We do not attempt to solve an equilibrium model of the market, but rather focus on an individual firm’s pricing 
decision, who takes the market price and its own residual demand as given. 
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of her ε, whereas a type-II consumer is uncertain about it.  The mass of informed consumers 
(type-I) is ）1,0（ , of which αβ, β∈[0,1), visit Dianping and may have learned their values 
there, while α(1 - β) do not visit Dianping.  Type-II consumers visit Dianping and remain 
uncertain about their valuations.
3
   Firms and consumers are assumed to be risk neutral.  
First, consider uniform monopoly pricing.  In this simple model, only three prices can be 
potentially optimal under uniform pricing: pu = k, pu = k + δ, or pu = k - δ. Under pu = k, informed 
consumers whose realized ε is δ and all uncertain consumers will purchase, resulting in profit 
(α/2 + 1 - α)k.  Under pu = k + δ, only informed consumers whose realized ε is δ will purchase, 
resulting in profit α(k+δ)/2.  Under pu = k - δ, all consumers will purchase, resulting in profit 
k - δ.  It follows that pu = k is optimal if 
(α/2 + 1 - α)k ≥ max{α(k + δ)/2, k – α}, or α ≤ min

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which is satisfied if δ is not too large compared to k (δ < k/2 necessarily) and α is also not too 
high (sufficient if α ≤ 2/3).  Then, min
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3
 That is, mass α(1 - β) of consumers, who know their values for the restaurant, do not visit Dianping. The rest of the 
consumers visit Dianping, among whom 1 - α will remain uncertain about their values. So the website provides 
useful information, but can resolve value uncertainty only for a portion of consumers. 
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and the maximum profit under uniform pricing is 
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 Next, under price discrimination, the firm can charge a high “regular” price ph and a 
promotion price through a coupon, pl.  There are three potentially optimal pairs of prices: 
(k + δ, k), (k + δ, k - δ), and (k, k - δ).  If ph = k + δ and pl = k, informed consumers who do not 
visit Dianping and whose realized V is k + δ will purchase and pay ph = k + δ; among consumers 
who visit Dianping, those whose realized V is known to be k + δ and those who remain uncertain 
will purchase at price pl = k.  Thus profit under ph = k + δ and pl = k is 
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Prices ph = k and pl = k – δ cannot be optimal under couponing since the profit under these prices 
is 
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_
α  > 2δ/k since k > 2δ from condition (1).  Hence, the optimal prices under price 
discrimination, or couponing, are 
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Therefore, a seller’s optimal prices are either k or k – δ under uniform pricing, and its 
optimal prices when issuing coupons are either (k + δ, k) or (k + δ, k - δ).  Under uniform 
pricing, consumers with known high valuation receive positive surplus.  By separating (some of) 
them and raising their price to *hp  = k + δ, the seller is able to extract additional surplus from the 
high-value consumers, while maintaining profits from the other consumers (who are charged 
*
lp = k or
*
lp = k - δ).  Online couponing can thus boost profit.  In practice, there could be 
additional transaction or advertising costs associated with couponing, which may be a reason that 
only some firms will issue coupons.  However, even if it incurs no additional cost, couponing 
does not always increase profit.  For instance, suppose that price is k - δ under uniform pricing.  
All consumers purchase at this price.  If the “regular” price is raised to k + δ and a coupon is 
issued, consumers who know their valuations to be k - δ may no longer purchase, which 
negatively affects the firm’s profit.  Hence, as stated formally in the proposition below, which 
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summarizes the optimal prices with or without couponing, if k and α are large, couponing may 
not be profitable. 
Proposition 1 Under condition (1): (i) Suppose that k 3δ .  Then, couponing increases profit.  
If 
k
2δ
 , a seller’s optimal prices are *up  = k under uniform pricing and ),(
**
lh pp  = (k + δ, k) 
under couponing; if 
k
2δ
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**
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2δ
α

 . 
Proof. See Appendix A.  ■ 
Proposition 1 suggests two testable predictions consistent with restaurants using coupons 
for price discrimination: (1) average prices are higher when coupons are issued, and (2) among 
firms that issue coupons, those for which consumer values are more uncertain (in the sense of 
having a higher δ) will have a higher average price.  We next turn to the discussion of our 
empirical model and data to evaluate these predictions. 
 
3. EMPRICAL MODEL 
We are interested in the relationship between restaurant prices and coupons, and whether 
this relationship varies with uncertainty in consumer valuations for the restaurant.  Below, we 
specify and estimate a price equation for restaurants with controls for quality and other cost and 
demand factors.  We can then observe whether, conditional on these factors, there is a systematic 
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relationship between prices and coupons, and whether uncertainty in consumer valuations for the 
restaurant affects this relationship. 
The empirical model for restaurant i = 1, 2, …, N with premise j = 1, 2, … J at location  
l = 1, 2, … L serving food brand t = 1, 2, …, T is: 
ijlttljijltijlt
ijltijltijltijltijlt
uSIZEQUALITY
YUNCERTAINTCOUPONYUNCERTAINTCOUPONPRICE




54
321 )(
 (9) 
where PRICE is the average expenditure per customer, COUPON equals one if the restaurant 
offers an online coupon and zero otherwise, UNCERTAINTY is the uncertainty about consumer 
valuations for the restaurant, QUALITY is the quality of the restaurant, SIZE is the potential size 
of the uncertain (i.e., type-II) consumer group, ηj are fixed effects that control for unobserved 
cost and demand factors specific to the premises within the restaurant chain, µl are fixed effects 
that control for cost and demand factors specific to the location, υt are fixed effects that control 
for cost and demand factors specific to the food brand, ϕ1 through ϕ5 are parameters to be 
estimated, and u is an error. 
The empirical model is used for descriptive analysis and does not claim to estimate a 
causal relationship between PRICE and COUPON.  A causal interpretation of the estimated 
parameters on COUPON, ϕ1 and ϕ3, would have to assume that there are no unobserved cost and 
demand factors that are correlated with the restaurant’s decisions about menu prices and the 
decision to issue an online coupon.  Given non-random assignment of coupons across 
restaurants, this assumption is unlikely to hold.  As such, we use fixed effects to control for cost 
and demand factors specific to the restaurant chain, food brand and location, and interpret ϕ1 and 
ϕ3 as conditional correlations.  These estimates, when combined with the predictions from the 
theoretical model, allow us to make reasonable inferences about why firms offer coupons? 
The important economic effect of interest is: 
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∂PRICE/∂COUPON = ϕ1 + ϕ3UNCERTAINTY                   (10) 
Estimates of ϕ1 and ϕ3 from price equation (9) measure the relationship between restaurant prices 
and online couponing.  If the null hypothesis that ϕ1 = ϕ3 = 0 cannot be rejected, this would be 
taken as evidence that prices are not correlated with coupons.  The finding that ϕ1 < 0 and ϕ3 = 0 
indicates that prices are negatively correlated with coupons, which is inconsistent with static 
monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions (Nevo and Wolfram, 2002).  
The finding that ϕ1 > 0 and ϕ3 = 0 indicates that prices are positively correlated with coupons, 
which is consistent with the practice of price discrimination as described by prediction (1) from 
our theoretical model.  Moreover, the finding that ϕ1 > 0 and ϕ3 > 0 indicates that the correlation 
between prices and coupons becomes more positive with more uncertainty about consumer 
valuations for the restaurant, as described by prediction (2) from our theoretical model.  A 
finding of this nature indicates that both vertical differentiation and quality uncertainty are more 
important in restaurant markets relative to say, ready-to-eat breakfast cereals.  Specifically, 
online couponing in the restaurant industry is used for price discrimination and as a promotional 
device in the presence of higher uncertainty in consumer valuations for the restaurant. 
 
4. DATA 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample of restaurants is from the city of Shanghai.  Shanghai’s population of 23 
million is dispersed over 2,477 square miles, with a population density of 9,406 persons per 
square mile.  The “inner ring” is the busiest section of the city with an area of about 46 square 
miles and population density of about 87,800 persons per square mile,  Domestic tourist visits 
are about 129 million per year and international tourist visits are about 6.29 million per year.  
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Approximately 64 percent of Shanghai’s households have Internet access and about 123 percent 
of the population have a cellular telephone, which suggests that some people have more than one 
cellular telephone.  At December 2010, Shanghai was served by approximately 48,000 
restaurants and the average expenditure per customer was 88 Yuan or, 13 United States dollars 
(USD).  Table 1 presents selected economic and social characteristics for Shanghai and compares 
them to the cities of Beijing, New York and Tokyo. 
Restaurant data are obtained from Dianping.  The company was founded in April, 2003, 
initially as a restaurant review web site similar to the Zagat Survey of restaurants.  Like Yelp.com 
in the United States, Dianping has more recently expanded its operations to help consumers find 
different local restaurants and other businesses, and to share their experiences with other 
consumers.  After creating a brief personal profile, contributing consumers log on to 
www.dianping.com to make a public comment and/or to review a particular restaurant.  This 
information is merged with restaurant name, location, style of food served and promotional 
activities, and summarized on the www.dianping.com web site.  Visitors to the web site access 
this information by searching for keywords and/or by directly accessing the drop down-menus 
for specific topics.  At 2009, Dianping was receiving about ten million unique Internet “hits” per 
month with a growth rate of five percent per month (Bye, 2009).  
Dianping’s main source of revenue is through paid search results.  A restaurant can buy a 
keyword, such as “hotpot”, and the restaurant’s name and web link will feature more 
prominently in the search results for hotpot.  At 2009, the most valuable keywords were 
“Sichuan” and Shanghai business areas, such as “Peoples Park” and “Suzhou Wei”, which were 
retailing for about $1,000 USD per month (Bye, 2009).  Dianping also earns revenue by 
providing restaurant coupons on their website.  Users can print or download these coupons to 
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their cellular telephone and redeem the coupon at the restaurant.  The company’s other activities 
include the publication of a restaurant consumption index for Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and 
Hangzhou, the provision of membership cards for consumer specials at participating restaurants, 
advertising for restaurants and other businesses, and cellular telephone services for restaurant 
search, consumer reviews and the booking of restaurant tables. 
From June 8 to June 12, 2010, we visited the www.dianping.com web site and 
downloaded place, product and promotion information and customer reviews for 3,745 multi-
premise restaurants.
4
  This information described several characteristics of the restaurant: name; 
location; style (or, brand) of food; whether the restaurant issues coupons; coupon conditions
5
; the 
number of users providing restaurant reviews; expenditure per customer; reviewer’s evaluations 
of the restaurant’s food quality, environment and service, respectively; and the reviewer’s overall 
rating of the restaurant.  Further analysis of these data revealed that 423 observations in the gross 
sample had incomplete information.  After omitting these observations, the net sample comprised 
of 3,324 restaurants with complete data for the characteristics described above.  The decision to 
study multi-premise restaurants is deliberate.  Because each restaurant has at least two premises, 
we are able to use restaurant fixed effects in our empirical model to control for unobserved cost 
and demand factors that are constant between premises within a restaurant chain. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 At June, 2010, Dianping listed just over 40,000 Shanghai restaurants on its website. However, more than three-
quarters of these had insufficient customer review information and were not suitable for empirical analysis. 
5
 For some of the online coupons in our dataset it is possible to use the information on coupon conditions to 
calculate the discount value of the coupon in Yuan. For robustness, we use this information in Section 5 to test the 
relationship between restaurant price and the discount value of the coupon, as opposed to whether the restaurant 
issues a coupon or not. 
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4.2 Variables and summary statistics 
The unit of observation is the “typical meal” sold by the 3,324 restaurant premises within 
the sample.  Restaurant premises are owned and operated by 929 multi-premise restaurants 
(“chains”) at 113 locations throughout Shanghai, serving 17 different food brands.  The locations 
are typically defined by proximity to bus and subway stops, shopping malls, stadiums, 
universities, business districts and famous landmarks.  The food brands are Guizhou, Japanese, 
Korean, Northeast Chinese, Southeast Asian, Spicy Hunan, Taiwan, Vegetarian, Xinjiang, 
Buffet, Cantonese, Fast Food, Hotpot, Local Shanghai, Spicy Sichuan, Western, and Other. 
The outcome variable of interest is PRICE, which is the average expenditure per 
customer for customers who logged on to www.dianping.com to review the restaurant.  Because 
it is calculated from the review information provided by contributors to www.dianping.com, 
PRICE provides a rough proxy for the true average price per customer for all customers of the 
restaurant. 
The key explanatory variables of interest are whether the restaurant offers a coupon and 
uncertainty about consumer valuations for the restaurant.  We define COUPON to equal one if 
the restaurant offers an online coupon and zero otherwise.  Measuring consumer uncertainty is 
difficult.  Ideally, we require a sample of consumer’s valuations for Shanghai restaurants to 
measure consumer uncertainty, but www.dianping.com do not have these data or do not readily 
share it with the public.  They do, however, provide average customer evaluations for three 
independent dimensions of restaurant quality, k{environment, taste, service}.  We use these 
data and Theil’s entropy measure to construct the following proxy for uncertainty in consumer 
valuations for each restaurant premise:  

k
kklogssYUNCERTAINT          (11) 
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where log is the natural log transformation, sk is the ratio of the average customer evaluation of 
individual dimension k to the sum of average customer evaluations for all three dimensions, 
environment, taste, and service.  For example, when one dimension comprises most of the total 
evaluation, entropy (UNCERTAINTY) approaches zero.  In this restaurant, it is more likely that 
consumers are uncertain about their valuations for the restaurant with respect to environment, 
taste and services.   When all three dimensions have an equal share of the total evaluation, 
UNCERTAINTY equals its maximum sample value of 1.099.  Here, consumers are likely to be 
much more certain about their valuations for the restaurant with respect to environment, taste and 
service.   
We measure QUALITY with the average reviewer evaluation of the overall rating of the 
restaurant on a five-point scale ranging from poor (one) to very good (five).
6
  Our theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that restaurant prices are increasing in QUALITY.  DOWNLOADS, 
which is the number of downloads of the restaurant’s online coupon (that is, SIZE in equation 9), 
controls for the potential size of the uncertain type-II consumer group.  Our theoretical model 
shows that there is a size threshold for this consumer group (1 - α) that makes price 
discrimination more profitable (“threshold effect”), so to some extent, prices should be 
increasing in DOWNLOADS.  However, because we are using a descriptive model, it is possible 
that there are less downloads because of lack of interest in the restaurant due to higher prices.  
When this “reverse causality effect” is large relative to the threshold effect, there may be no 
empirical relationship between prices and DOWNLOADS or the relationship maybe negative.  
                                                 
6
 Because QUALITY and UNCERTAINTY are calculated from user reviews, we need to consider their authenticity. 
Tau Zhang, the founder of Dianping, notes that fake reviews “can be a problem” and that as the Dianping.com 
website grows, more people try to spam and trick the website (Bye, 2009). Among other things, Dianping use a 
credibility score to help verify user reviews. Dianping looks at IP addresses, log in name, password, etc. and the 
kind of activities users do on the website (e.g., write a review) and assign points to the user. For their review to show 
on the first page, the user must obtain a high number of credibility points. 
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Table 2 describes the variables used in equation (9) and Table 3 presents summary 
statistics.  The number of premises per restaurant ranges from two to 53, with a (weighted) 
average of 9.574 premises per restaurant.  Just over 15 percent of restaurant premises offer 
online coupons.  On average, about 449 users per premise logged on to www.dinaping.com to 
share information on expenditures and evaluations of quality.  Average expenditure per customer 
(PRICE) was 73.17 Yuan (or, 10.80 USD) and average quality (QUALITY) was 3.681 out of five.  
Customers appear to be reasonably certain about their valuations for restaurants.  Although 
UNCERTAINTY ranges from 0.809 to 1.099, the average value of 1.086 is closer to 1.099, which 
indicates more certainty about consumer valuations with respect to environment, taste and 
service.
7
  The average number of coupon downloads per restaurant premise (DOWNLOADS) 
ranged from zero to 10,018, with an average of 227.  The average number of downloads, 
conditional on the restaurant offering a coupon, is 1,473.
8
 
 
4.3 Preliminary empirical evidence 
Our theory suggests two testable predictions consistent with restaurants using coupons 
for price discrimination.  First, prices are higher when coupons are issued, and second, among 
firms that issue coupons, those for which consumer valuations are more uncertain, will have a 
higher price.  To examine these predictions, we first present some simple comparisons of prices 
between restaurants that do and no not offer coupons and between restaurants with high- versus 
low-uncertainty about consumer valuations.  Low-uncertainty (high-uncertainty) restaurant-
                                                 
7
 Note that is equivalent to a low value for δ in our theoretical model and supports simplifying assumption (1). 
8
 The number of customer visits to the typical restaurant premise’s online coupon link ranged from zero to 36,805, 
with an average of 1,042. The number of customer visits to the typical restaurant premise’s online coupon link, 
conditional on the restaurant offering coupons, is 6,737. 
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premise observations are defined as those where UNCERTAINTY is less than (greater than) the 
sample’s 50th percentile.   
Table 4 presents group mean comparison tests of restaurant prices.  Panel (1) shows that 
the average price in restaurants that offer coupons is about 9.27 Yuan (or, 12.9 percent) higher 
than restaurants that do not offer coupons.  Panel (2) shows that for high-uncertainty restaurants, 
the average price in restaurants that offer coupons is about 16.75 Yuan (or, 27.7 percent) higher, 
and panel (3) shows no significant difference in prices in low-uncertainty restaurants.  By 
indicating that prices may be positively related to couponing and that the relationship is more 
pronounced for high-uncertainty restaurants, these preliminary results provide some support for 
prediction’s (1) and (2) from our theory.  In the next section, we explore these relationships 
further with a regression approach that controls for quality, cost and demand factors. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The empirical model and data described in Section 3 and Section 4 are used to investigate 
the relationship between prices and coupons in the Shanghai restaurant market.  We estimate 
several model specifications of the price equation (9): with and without measures of quality and 
consumer uncertainty; with and without the interaction term between couponing and consumer 
uncertainty; with additional controls for unobserved quality that may be correlated with the 
prices and the propensity to issue coupons (for example, provision of wireless Internet access in 
the restaurant, number of hours restaurant is open); and with an alternative measure of coupons 
that indicates the discount value of the coupon in Yuan.  Because the sample observations 
represent averages and are likely to vary by the number of elements used to calculate the 
averages, we expect the error variances from equation (5) to vary with the number of customers 
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contributing reviews to www.dianping.com (RESPONSES).  We improve the efficiency of our 
estimator by addressing this form of heteroskedasticity with a weighted least squares (WLS) 
procedure that divides price equation (9) through by RESPONSES . 
 
5.1 Baseline results 
WLS estimates of the double-log price equation are presented in Table 5.  The first 
column shows the baseline model specification (i) where we regress restaurant prices on 
COUPON, the number of downloads of the restaurant’s online coupon (DOWNLOADS), and 
restaurant-, brand- and location-specific fixed effects.  The estimated coefficient on 
DOWNLOADS is negative and significant at the one percent level.  This finding suggests that the 
threshold effect for price discrimination may be outweighed by the reverse causality effect.  The 
estimated coefficient on COUPON is positive (0.108), significant at the one percent level, and 
supports prediction (1) from our theory.  Specifically, this estimate indicates that the average 
price at restaurants that offer online coupons is about eleven percent higher than similar 
restaurants that do not issue coupons. 
Model (ii) includes QUALITY in the price equation to control for differences in overall 
quality between restaurant premises.  The second column of Table 5 shows the results from 
model (ii) where we regress prices on COUPON, the average reviewer evaluation of the “overall 
rating” of the restaurant (QUALITY), DOWNLOADS, and restaurant-, brand- and location-
specific fixed effects.  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported for model (i).  The 
estimated coefficient on DOWNLOADS remains negative, and, as expected, the estimated 
coefficient on QUALITY indicates a positive correlation between prices and quality.  The 
estimated coefficient on COUPON is 0.116 and is significant at the five percent level.   
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The next two model specifications consider the price effects from uncertainty about 
consumer valuations for the restaurant.  Model (iii) regresses prices on COUPON, the entropy 
measure of consumer uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY), QUALITY, DOWNLOADS, and restaurant-, 
brand- and location-specific fixed effects.  To be consistent with the theoretical model, we 
multiply logUNCERTAINTY by negative one before including it in the price equation so that an 
increase in this variable indicates that consumer valuations are more uncertain (in the sense of 
having a higher  ).  As shown in column three, the inclusion of UNCERTAINTY in the price 
equation has little impact on the estimated coefficients for COUPON, QUALITY and 
DOWNLOADS.  The estimated coefficient on UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant at the 
one percent level.  This result implies that, after controlling for online couponing, greater 
uncertainty is associated with lower prices, which is consistent with proposition (1) from our 
theoretical model that prices are non-increasing in uncertainty.  The estimated coefficient on 
COUPON is 0.117, significant at the one percent level, and continues to indicate that the average 
price at restaurants that offer coupons is about eleven to twelve percent higher than similar 
restaurants that do not offer coupons. 
Until now, model specification’s (i) through (iii) have been used to test prediction (1) 
from our theory.  It is not possible to comment on prediction (2) because the interaction term 
between coupons and consumer uncertainty was excluded from the specification of the price 
equation.  Model (iv) addresses this by regressing prices on COUPON, UNCERTAINTY, 
COUPON×UNCERTAINTY, QUALITY, DOWNLOADS, and restaurant-, brand- and location-
specific fixed effects.  Column four of Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficients on 
COUPON and COUPON×UNCERTAINTY are both statistically significant and result in: 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON = 0.254 + 1.626logUNCERTAINTY. 
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When evaluated at the mean value for UNCERTAINTY, the estimate of  ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON 
is positive (0.120), significant at the five percent level, and indicates that the average price at 
restaurants that offer coupons is about twelve percent higher than similar restaurants that do not 
offer coupons.  This result is almost identical to the correlations between average prices and 
online couponing reported for model specification’s (i) through (iii).  Interestingly, the estimate 
of ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON shows that the correlation between prices and coupons becomes more 
positive when consumer valuations are more uncertain for the restaurant.  Some sense of this 
effect is obtained by evaluating ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON at the sample minimum and maximum 
values for UNCERTAINTY.  When evaluated at the minimum value (i.e., “less consumer 
uncertainty”), the average price for restaurants offering coupons is about ten percent higher than 
restaurants that do not offer coupons.  When evaluated at the maximum value (i.e., “more 
consumer uncertainty”), the average price for restaurants offering coupons is about 60 percent  
higher than restaurants without coupons.
9
  Figure 1 plots the correlation between prices and 
coupons over the sample range for uncertainty about consumer valuations. 
 
5.2 Robustness 
It is possible that our results in Table 5 reflect differences in some additional 
(unmeasured) services provided by restaurants.  Specifically, restaurant’s that issue online 
coupons may also provide other online services within their restaurant that raise both quality and 
prices.   For robustness, we include WIRELESS (equals one when the restaurant premise provides 
patrons with wireless access for cellular telephones and laptop computers and zero otherwise) in 
                                                 
9
 Because the sample mean for UNCERTAINTY is close to the sample maximum, it is possible that relatively low 
values for this variable maybe driving our results in column four of Table 5. To test this possibility, we estimated 
model specification (iv) on a subsample that excluded all observations with a value of UNCERTAINTY below the 
tenth percentile. The results, not reported, are qualitatively similar to those in column four of Table 3. 
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model specification (v) to control for restaurant-premise differences in the provision of 
additional information technology services.  The number of hours per day that a restaurant is 
open may also be a an indicator of quality and the propensity to issue coupons.  For example, 
restaurants that are open all day are more likely to be low-valuation, high volume (“fast food”) 
restaurants and are less likely to target potential customers with online coupons.  As an 
additional robustness check, we also include BREAKFAST (equals one when the restaurant is 
open for breakfast, and zero otherwise) and LUNCH (equals one when the restaurant is open for 
lunch, and zero otherwise) in model specification (v) to control for these potentially omitted 
quality effects.
10
 
Because the data on wireless access and number of hours open were not available for all 
restaurants, we estimate the price equation on the reduced sample of 2,932 restaurant-premises.  
For comparison with Table 5, column one of Table 6 reports estimates of model specification 
(iv) on the reduced sample without any of the additional control variables.  We then sequentially 
add WIRELESS to model (v) (column two of Table 6), WIRELESS and BREAKFAST to model 
(vi) (column three of Table 6) and WIRELESS, BREAKFAST and LUNCH to model (vii) (column 
four of Table 6) to model (vii).  Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 5.  The estimated coefficient on COUPON is positive and significant across all four 
specifications.  The estimated coefficient on COUPON×UNCERTAINTY is also positive across 
all four specifications but marginally insignificant in model’s (vi) and (vii).  A comparison of 
model (vii) results in Table 6 to model (iv) results in Table 5 show that the inclusion of the 
additional controls results in smaller estimates of ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON.  When evaluated at 
the mean value for UNCERTAINTY, the estimate of ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON indicates that the 
                                                 
10
 About 19 percent of restaurants in the sample provide wireless access to patrons. All restaurants open for dinner, 
about 99 percent open for lunch and about ten percent open for breakfast. 
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average price for restaurants offering coupons is about ten percent higher than restaurants that do 
not offer coupons.  When evaluated at the minimum value, the average price for restaurants 
offering coupons is about nine percent higher than restaurants that do not offer coupons, 
although this affect marginally insignificant at the ten percent level.  When evaluated at the 
maximum value, the average price for restaurants offering coupons is about 52 percent higher 
than restaurants without coupons. 
We also estimated the price equation (5) with an alternative measure of online couponing.  
Of the 514 restaurant-premises in our sample that issue coupons, 291 provide specific 
information on the discount value of the coupon, 221 indicate that the coupon is a “special” that 
allows the customer to buy one course and get something free, and two provided no information.  
Following Nevo and Wolfram (2002), we use this information to construct DOLLARS OFF, 
which equals the discount value of the coupon in Yuan, and zero when no coupon is offered.
11
   
Estimates of model specification’s (i) through (iv) using DOLLARS OFF as the measure 
of online couponing are presented in Table 7.
12
  The price equation estimates are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 5 and Table 6.  Focusing on column’s (i) through (iii), we 
observe that the estimated coefficients on DOLLARS OFF are about 0.056 and significant at the 
one percent level across all three model specification’s (i) through (iii).  These results suggest 
that the average price for restaurants that offer coupons is higher than similar restaurants that do 
not, and that the average price is increasing in the discount value of the coupon.  In model (iv), 
                                                 
11
 About 75 percent of these observations had information on the value of the coupon in Yuan and the remaining 
observations had information on the percentage discount. We converted the percentage discount to Yuan by 
multiplying the percentage discount by the average expenditure per restaurant per capita. For coupons that offered 
consumers a choice of a Yuan discount or a percentage discount, we used the Yuan discount. When multiple 
coupons were issued by a restaurant premise, for example, dinner versus lunch or weekend versus weekdays, we 
calculated the average discount across all coupons. For the 291 observations with information on the value of the 
coupon, the conditional mean PRICE was 83.15 Yuan and the conditional mean DOLLARS OFF was 47.58 Yuan. 
12
 The 221 observations with a special coupon are excluded, as are the two observations with no precise coupon 
information, which leaves an effective sample size for estimation of 3,101. 
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the estimated coefficients on DOLLARS OFF and DOLLARS OFF×UNCERTAINTY are both 
statistically significant and result in: 
∂logPRICE/∂logDOLLARS OFF = 0.115 + 0.639logUNCERTAINTY. 
When evaluated at the mean value for UNCERTAINTY, the estimate of ∂logPRICE/∂log 
DOLLARS OFF is positive (0.063), significant at the one percent level, and indicates that a ten 
percent increase in the discount value of the coupon is associated with a 0.63 percent increase in 
the average price.  When evaluated at the minimum value, a ten percent increase in coupon value 
is associated with a 0.55 percent increase in the average price.  When evaluated at the maximum 
value, a ten percent increase in coupon value is associated with a 2.51 percent increase in the 
average price. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has conducted a new empirical study of why firms issue coupons, using a 
unique data set of restaurants in Shanghai and a novel approach that focuses on the role of 
consumer uncertainty.  A distinctive feature of the market is that a sufficient portion of 
consumers are uncertain about their valuations of specific restaurants.  Online coupons are issued 
through a website that provides restaurant information.  To the extent that there are costs to 
search the website, consumers who are informed of their valuations are less likely to conduct the 
costly search.  A restaurant may thus use online coupons to engage in price discrimination, 
charging a higher “regular” price for higher-value consumers and a lower price with coupons to 
uncertain consumers as a way of promotion.  In support of the predictions from this theoretical 
reasoning, our empirical analysis finds that there is a positive relationship between prices and 
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online coupons, and that the price premium from couponing is higher for restaurants about which 
consumer values appear to be more uncertain.  
As Nevo and Wolfram (2002) points out, more economic analysis of couponing is much 
needed, due to its importance in firms’  promotion activities and in comparison to the substantial 
work by economists devoted to the study of advertising, the other predominant form of 
marketing.  Our paper complements Nevo and Wolfram’s study of prices and couponing in the 
breakfast cereals industry. In contrast to their finding that prices are negatively related to 
couponing, we found a positive relationship in the restaurant market in Shanghai.  It appears that 
two key features of the Shanghai restaurant market, some product uncertainty and a large number 
of differentiated producers (so that each producer may take its residual demand as given when 
setting price), might have contributed to the difference in the findings.  Taken together, the 
empirical evidences suggest that the nature of products and of market structure can play 
important roles in determining the motives to issue coupons and the price-couponing 
relationship. 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 Beijing Shanghai New York Tokyo 
Area (miles
2
) 6,488 2,447 301 844 
Population (million) 19.6 23.0 8.21 13.0 
Population density (persons per mile
2
) 3,023 9,406 27,289 15,383 
Gross domestic product per capita (USD) 10,314 11,563 57,173  64,722
a
 
Percent of adult population unemployed 1.4 4.3 8.2 4.5 
Percent of adult population with college education 31.5 22.0 27.4 27.1 
Percent of adult population with high school education 21.2 21.0 72.3 n.a. 
Domestic tourists per year (million) 180 124 39.0 n.a.  
International tourists per year (million) 4.90 6.29 9.70 4.76 
Percent of homes with Internet access 69.4 64.5   81.5
b
 85.9 
Percent of population with cellular telephone 121 123   88.4
b
 140 
Number of restaurants 36,658 ≈48,000 23,499 ≈60,000 
Expenditure per person per dinner (USD)  10.00 13.00 41.81 70.64 
NOTES. Data are from 2008 through 2010. a denotes 2002. b denotes New York state. n.a. is not available. USD is 
United States dollars. 
SOURCES. http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/frontshgl/18677.html; 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html; 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=2; 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/report-finds-big-divide-in-internet-access/; 
http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/xwgb/tjgb/pcgb/201105/t20110504_201364.htm; 
http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.jp/tnenkan/tn-eindex.htm. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20020516a6.html; 
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and http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-301823A1.pdf. 
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TABLE 2 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variable Description 
PRICE Average expenditure per customer (Yuan) for all customers 
who logged on to www.dianping.com to review the 
restaurant. 
COUPON One when the restaurant offers an online coupon, and zero 
otherwise. 
QUALITY Average overall rating of the restaurant per customer for all 
customers who logged on to www.dianping.com to review 
the restaurant. Overall rating ranges from one (poor) to five 
(very good). 
UNCERTAINTY Entropy measure of uncertainty of consumer valuations for 
the restaurant with respect to three dimensions of quality: 
environment; taste; and services. 
DOWNLOADS Number of downloads of the restaurant’s online coupon from 
www.dianping.com. Zero if the restaurant does not offer an 
online coupon. 
DOLLARS OFF Discount value of the coupon in Yuan. Zero if the restaurant 
does not offer an online coupon. 
PREMISES Number of premises within the restaurant chain. 
 
WIRELESS One when the restaurant provides wireless telephone and 
Internet access, and zero otherwise.  
BREAKFAST One when the restaurant is open for breakfast, and zero 
otherwise. 
LUNCH One when the restaurant is open for lunch, and zero 
otherwise. 
RESPONSES Number of contributing customers who log on to 
www.dianping.com to review the restaurant. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Full sample (n = 3,324)     
PRICE 73.17 57.26 7 545 
COUPON 0.155 0.362 0 1 
QUALITY 3.680 0.870 1 5 
UNCERTAINTY 1.086 0.020 0.809 1.099 
DOWNLOADS 227.0 909.7 0 10,018 
PREMISES 9.574 11.44 2 53 
RESPONSES 449.0 992.2 5 19,429 
Coupon sample (n = 514)     
PRICE 80.52 42.80 9 397 
QUALITY 4.057 0.673 1 5 
UNCERTAINTY 1.093 0.007 1.036 1.099 
DOWNLOADS 1,473 1,882 0 10,018 
PREMISES 11.52 14.38 2 53 
RESPONSES 745.8 1,265 5 11,215 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
GROUP MEAN COMPARISON TESTS OF PRICES 
All restaurants (1) High-uncertainty restaurants (2) Low-uncertainty restaurants (3) 
Group Obs.  Mean Group Obs.  Mean Group Obs.  Mean 
No coupon 1,810 71.74 
(1.12) 
No coupon 1,502 60.41 
(1.22) 
No coupon 1,308 84.76 
(1.89) 
Coupon   514 81.01 
(1.92) 
Coupon   144 77.15 
(3.09) 
Coupon   370 82.51 
(2.38) 
Difference   9.27
***
 
(2.74) 
Difference 
 
 16.75
***
 
(4.05) 
Difference 
 
 -2.25 
(3.78) 
NOTES. High-uncertainty (low-uncertainty) restaurant-premise observations are those where UNCERTAINTY is less than (greater 
than) the sample’s 50th percentile. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***significant at the 0.1 level. Obs. is number of observations. 
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TABLE 5 
WLS ESTIMATES OF PRICE EQUATION 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv) 
COUPON   0.108
*
 
(0.057) 
   0.116
**
 
(0.102) 
   0.117
**
 
(0.135) 
    0.254
***
 
(0.094) 
UNCERTAINTY      -2.039
***
 
(0.290) 
   -2.225
***
 
(0.308) 
COUPONUNCERTAINTY  
 
    1.626
*
 
(0.904) 
QUALITY      0.142
***
 
(0.018) 
    0.135
***
 
(0.018) 
    0.135
***
 
(0.018) 
DOWNLOADS    -0.025
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.027
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.029
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.027
***
 
(0.009) 
CONSTANT     3.605
*** 
(0.161) 
     3.378
*** 
(0.162) 
    3.271
*** 
(0.161) 
    3.261
*** 
(0.161) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (max)       0.598** 
(0.273) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (mean)       0.120** 
(0.056) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (min)      0.101* 
(0.057) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.971 0.972 0.972 0.972 
NOTES. Dependent variable is the log of average expenditure per customer (logPRICE). ***significant at the 0.01 
level. **significant at the 0.05 level. *significant at the 0.1 level. Weights for WLS estimation are the number of 
contributing customers who log on to www.dianping.com to review a restaurant (RESPONSES). Standard errors 
for ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON are calculated with the delta method. Restaurant fixed effects, brand fixed effects 
and location fixed effects not reported. 3,324 restaurant-premise observations.  
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TABLE 6 
WLS ESTIMATES OF PRICE EQUATION WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
 Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi) Model (vii) 
COUPON     0.250
***
 
(0.010) 
    0.250
***
 
(0.010) 
    0.219
***
 
(0.010) 
    0.219
***
 
(0.010) 
UNCERTAINTY    -2.525
***
 
(0.340) 
   -2.502
***
 
(0.340) 
   -2.386
***
 
(0.339) 
   -2.383
***
 
(0.339) 
COUPONUNCERTAINTY   1.782* 
(0.969) 
  1.809
*
 
(0.969) 
1.411 
(0.968) 
1.404 
(0.968) 
QUALITY     0.142
***
 
(0.020) 
    0.143
***
 
(0.020) 
    0.140
***
 
(0.020) 
    0.140
***
 
(0.020) 
DOWNLOADS    -0.026
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.026
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.026
***
 
(0.009) 
   -0.026
***
 
(0.009) 
WIRELESS 
 
  0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
 0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
 0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
BREAKFAST 
 
     -0.059
***
 
(0.013) 
   -0.059
***
 
(0.013) 
LUNCH 
 
   -0.017 
 (0.040) 
CONSTANT     3.211
*** 
(0.165) 
    3.210
*** 
(0.165) 
    3.223
*** 
(0.164) 
    3.240
*** 
(0.169) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (max)    0.628** 
(0.293) 
   0.633
** 
(0.292) 
  0.518
* 
(0.292) 
  0.516
* 
(0.292) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (mean)   0.104* 
(0.058) 
  0.101
* 
(0.058) 
  0.104
* 
(0.058) 
  0.103
* 
(0.058) 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON (min) 0.083 
(0.059) 
0.079
 
(0.059) 
0.087
 
(0.059) 
0.087
 
(0.059) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 
NOTES. Dependent variable is the log of average expenditure per customer (logPRICE). ***significant at the 0.01 
level. **significant at the 0.05 level. *significant at the 0.1 level. Weights for WLS estimation are the number of 
contributing customers who log on to www.dianping.com to review a restaurant (RESPONSES). Standard errors 
for ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON are calculated with the delta method. Restaurant fixed effects, brand fixed effects 
and location fixed effects not reported. 2,932 restaurant-premise observations.  
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TABLE 7 
WLS ESTIMATES OF PRICE EQUATION WITH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF COUPONS 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv) 
DOLLARS OFF     0.056
***
 
(0.018) 
    0.056
***
 
(0.018) 
    0.057
***
 
(0.018) 
    0.115
***
 
(0.032) 
UNCERTAINTY      -1.991
***
 
(0.298) 
   -2.213
***
 
(0.314) 
DOLLARS OFF UNCERTAINTY  
 
 
 
 
 
   0.639
**
 
(0.288) 
QUALITY      0.153
***
 
(0.019) 
    0.146
***
 
(0.019) 
    0.145
***
 
(0.019) 
DOWNLOADS    -0.058
***
 
(0.012) 
   -0.059
***
 
(0.012) 
   -0.061
***
 
(0.012) 
   -0.062
***
 
(0.012) 
CONSTANT     3.181
*** 
(0.579) 
    2.958
*** 
(0.571) 
    2.974
*** 
(0.566) 
    2.974
*** 
(0.565) 
∂logPRICE/∂DOLLARS OFF (max)        0.251*** 
(0.089) 
∂logPRICE/∂DOLLARS OFF (mean)        0.063*** 
(0.018) 
∂logPRICE/∂DOLLARS OFF (min)        0.055*** 
(0.018) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.970 0.971 0.971 0.971 
NOTES. Dependent variable is the log of average expenditure per customer (logPRICE). ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
**significant at the 0.05 level. *significant at the 0.1 level. Weights for WLS estimation are the number of contributing 
customers who log on to www.dianping.com to review a restaurant (RESPONSES). Standard errors for 
∂logPRICE/∂COUPON are calculated with the delta method. Restaurant fixed effects, brand fixed effects and location 
fixed effects not reported. 3,011 restaurant-premise observations.  
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FIGURE 1 
PRICE PREMIUM FROM COUPON AND UNCERTAINTY IN CONSUMER VALUATIONS 
 
NOTES. Calculated from the estimate of ∂logPRICE/∂COUPON reported in column 4 of Table 
5. Consumer uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY) ranges from the sample minimum of 0.809 (high 
uncertainty) to the sample maximum of 1.089 (low uncertainty). 
 
